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ABSTRACT
Spatial configurations amongst stimuli can influence magnitude attributions. Someone’s
acquired reading and writing direction (RWD) can provide a spatial schema of primacy
extending from left (maximum) to right (minimum) for Westerners and opposite for
leftward RWD languages. Primacy information can be transformed into a magnitude
attribution regarding a feature quality, perceiving an object as having “more” of a
certain quality for Westerners when positioned left amongst two similar objects,
likewise when positioned right for people with a right-to-left RWD. Results showed
that native English speakers tended to attribute greater magnitude of a given feature
in fictitious products displayed left within a pair, indicating which of two products was
“most” representative of a certain quality (Experiment 1a) but they would randomly
choose when asked which product represented “least” of the quality (Experiment 1b).
A similar, but reversed pattern of effects was obtained for Farsi participants only
familiar with Farsi (Experiment 2).
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In most cultures, people read either left-to-right or
right-to-left, and this habit might affect the proces-
sing of other stimuli outside reading or writing. Such
processing may associate “left” with higher primacy
than “right”, or vice versa. High-primacy stimuli
(seen more as “left”, or vice versa) may then be
attributed features with greater intensity or magni-
tude, than low-primacy stimuli. We aims at report-
ing evidence for these ideas.
Space can imply meaning
Recent research shows that physical parameters of
stimulus presentation, especially orientation of
stimuli in space, can have implications for interpret-
ation of the same stimulus. For example, target con-
cepts/objects shown at higher spatial locations (as
compared to lower spatial locations) are identified
easier and faster as powerful, or of positive
valence (Meier & Robinson, 2004; Schubert, 2005).
Likewise, target persons, objects, and scenarios
shown on the left side in a display (as compared
to the right side) are more often associated with
initiative, forcefulness, i.e. agentic characteristics in
general (Suitner & Maass, 2016). The theoretical
idea underlying this research is that, in the sense
of weak embodiment (Boroditsky & Ramscar,
2002), abstract, spatially based schemata are
invoked by the semantics of a certain class of
stimuli or task. According to this, stimuli carrying
power-related meanings (Schubert, 2005) will
invoke a vertical hierarchy schema. As well,
valence-related stimuli will invoke a vertical
schema of good vs. bad (Meier & Robinson, 2004).
Stimuli carrying an agency-related meaning (ath-
letes, pictorial presentations of social interactions)
will invoke a hoizontal schema of abstract agency
(Suitner & Maass, 2016; Tversky et al., 1991). When
the meaning of the stimuli by itself implies an
order, as in case of numbers, this will invoke a hori-
zontal order schema as well, with small numbers
represented on the left and larger numbers
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not
altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Ulrich von Hecker vonheckeru@Cardiff.ac.uk
JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
https://doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2021.1978472
represented on the right, for Westerners (Dehaene
et al., 1993). In the present research we limit our
considerations to the horizontal case, and we will
ask a novel, reversed question: Can spatially rep-
resented order implications be translated into mag-
nitude attributions with respect to object features?
We ask this question assuming that stimulus
meaning may be irrelevant for that spatial impli-
cation. We will first develop the theory behind the
assumptions so far, before turning to our own,
novel predictions.
Spatial primacy in the horizontal case
In general, arguments for the contribution of spatial
processes in forming mental representations often
rest on the demonstration of lateral asymmetries.
In particular, the learned reading/writing direction
(RWD) is often assumed to be the basis for such
asymmetries. For example, English-spoken partici-
pants (left-to-right RWD) spontaneously mapped a
sequence of events (such as the meals of the day)
onto a horizontal line directed rightward, placing
earlier events to the left and later events to the
right (Fuhrman & Boroditsky, 2010). This tendency
was reversed in Hebrew-speaking participants
(right-to-left RWD). Spanish speakers responded
faster when making judgments on whether words
refer to the past or the future when past-related
words appeared left and future-related words
appeared right on a screen (Ouellet et al., 2010; San-
tiago et al., 2007). In Dutch-speakers, months close
to the beginning of the year were responded to
faster with the left hand than with the right hand,
whereas the opposite was found true for months
toward the end of the year (Gevers et al., 2003).
Tversky et al. (1991) had children order pictures
into temporally ordered stories and found a ten-
dency to order these from left to right in English-
speaking children (left-to-right RWD), whereas this
tendency reversed in Arab and Hebrew children
who were used to right-to-left-written languages.
However, preliterate kindergarteners did not show
any such spatial biases (Dobel et al., 2007) which
again hints at the tight connection between RWD
and the orientation of the mental time line.
The explanations so far focus on the idea that the
learned reading/writing direction (RWD) is used as
an abstract template which a primacy dimension
can be mapped onto. So, for example, for the time
line in Westerners, it is assumed that the semantics
of the stimulus (e.g. events in a story, elements of a
sequential action, etc.) Automatically access a left-
ward schematic representation, abstracted from
the action implication of reading/writing: In the
West, one starts from left and goes rightwards.
This schema implies an action hierarchy, and there-
fore, if transformed into a more general action
schema, will imply an abstract order dimension (cf.
Suitner & Maass, 2016). In our own previous exper-
iments we studied learned order hierarchies, e.g.
A > B>C… etc., with letters standing for a hierarchy
of target persons of different age, wealth, strength,
or other abstract characteristics. Western partici-
pants were more likely to correctly identify the
dominant element in a randomly chosen pair (e.g.
A in A > B), and to be quicker for correct responses,
if the dominant element was displayed to the left of
the non-dominant element (as compared to a
display on the right). This effect reversed in an
Iranian sample (right-to-left RWD, von Hecker
et al., 2016). In line with findings from a variety of
paradigms (see also Chatterjee, 2001; Dehaene
et al., 1993; Tversky et al., 1991; Zebian, 2005), we
explained this as showing that, for Westerners as
well as for Iranians, the acquired reading/writing
direction (RWD) provides an abstract concept of
spatial primacy extending from left (maximum) to
right (minimum). In an actual episodic context, this
concept is then triggered by the meaning of the
relational stimuli, as these were learned as pairs of
an implied order hierarchy (e.g. A > B, B > C,… ,
etc.). Stated differently, the semantics of the
stimuli would invoke an available spatial schema
for ordering, in terms of RWD. In consequence, a
stimulus presentation that is perceived as congru-
ent with the invoked spatial schema (i.e. a horizontal
pair arrangement showing the dominant element at
the side closer to the RWD origin) would be easier to
process than a incongruent presentation, that is,
showing the spatially reversed arrangement (i.e.
dominant element on the side farther away from
the RWD origin). Congruent presentations, there-
fore, are expected to promote a processing advan-
tage over incongruent ones, leading to quicker
(and more correct) responses.
How spatial primacy is anchored
We argue that the dimensional maximum (not the
minimum), representing maximal magnitude in a
given context, is placed at the RWD origin,
through metaphorically blending spatial primacy
with the dominant end of the dimension (see
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Carney & Banaji, 2012; Casasanto, 2009): “The first in
a series (or a pair) is the leftmost (…). Linguistic
expressions like ‘the prime example’ conflate
primacy (magnitude) with goodness (i.e. this
phrase can mean the first example, the best
example, or both). Speakers of languages like
English may be predisposed to consider the left-
most item to be the first and therefore the best”.
(Casasanto, 2009, p. 362). “Conceptual Blending” is
defined here, following the linguistic literature, as
the integration of information from disparate
domains. When two concepts are blended, overlap-
ping aspects of their individual meanings form the
core of a new, enhanced, or pragmatically more
useful, integrated meaning (Coulson & Oakley,
2005; Fauconnier & Turner, 1998).
In this example, it is assumed that goodness is a
magnitude or an asset, and that more goodness
dominates less goodness.
Spatial primacy and magnitude
attribution
In the present research, we take a new approach
and ask a question which takes a reverse perspec-
tive, compared to the studies discussed so far,
which is: Can spatial primacy on its own contribute
information to the extent that a judgment on the
magnitude of a (hypothetical) feature attribute
may be influenced? In the research so far, spatial
primacy appears to be invoked by the semantics
of the very stimuli in question, and the relation
between two stimuli is sufficiently determined by
it. In other words, the meanings of those stimuli
carry an order relation between them, a priori, by
means of the information presented. For example,
e.g. in a pair A B, element A may be presented as
the older one than B, the wealthier one, the faster
one or anything other using a quantifiable compara-
tor term, be it concrete or abstract. In this situation,
the presented, comparative information about the
relation between A and B specifies the rank order
between the two as through the presented feature
quantity. This again can activate the notion of
primacy in terms of the spatial order representation.
The reverse question we ask here is, what happens
in a reduced situation where A and B are not
sufficiently specified attribute-wise, as to yield a
clear order relation between them. Such a situation
may be characterised, first, by the absence of any
recognisable dimension that one could use, a
priori, as diagnostic dimension to distinguish
between A and B. Second, the situation may be
such that nonetheless, an individual is asked to
make a comparative judgment between A and B
on a particular attribute dimension. Would then
spatial primacy, by virtue of metaphoric blending,
provide the information just needed? That is,
would the positioning of element A closer than
element B to the RWD origin in a pair, be blended
to yield the attribution of “dominance” of A over
B? If so, then at the time of testing, the process of
response generation may draw on this particular
source of information. In a horizontally presented
pair, the element that is mentally represented
closer to the RWD origin by means of spatial
primacy, is likely to be seen as the dominant one.
This primacy may in turn be translated into a mag-
nitude attribution that can be interpreted in an
ordinal sense.
Along these lines, we use horizontally presented
pairs of fictitious consumer objects as example
stimuli, and we ask whether schematic spatial
primacy, as derived from the participants’ RWD
background, would be blended with the queried
feature dimension and thus lead to the assignment
of some positive quality as a hypothetically inferred
(i.e. not perceived) stimulus attribute.
Practical relevance of a mechanism based
on spatial primacy
The novel theoretical question addressed in the
present paper is to what extent the spatial configur-
ation as such (in which a stimulus occurs) can
provide information that is ultimately attributed to
the stimulus itself. We ask whether unspecific
primacy information, derived from the spatial
arrangement in the display, can inform a judgment
about the magnitude of a concrete stimulus feature.
The present question, over and above its theoretical
importance, is also relevant to applied scenarios.
Imagine displays that present more than one stimu-
lus alongside each other in a horizontal setting, for
example, a line-up of products in a visual advert,
the positioning of products on a shelf, or the
spatial arrangement of content vignettes on a
website. It is possible that whatever a perceiver
will take away from a perceptual episode, in terms
of their understanding and appreciation of an
object, a message, or indeed a product presen-
tation, might be co-determined by the spatial
arrangement of how the objects are placed within
that spatial context.
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Obviously, in many cases, spatial location as a cue
will be competing against other diagnostic cues
that are available in the situation, for example
lateral fluency in left- vs. right-handedness (Casa-
santo & Chrysikou, 2011) or predominant food pre-
ferences (Romero & Biswas, 2016). But in time-
pressed situations, or when selecting amongst
options one isn’t familiar with, the spatial position-
ing of the products may contribute primacy infor-
mation, influencing decisions. A perceiver may be
in a hurry, or for some reason may have to select
amongst options s/he doesn’t know very much
about. If in such a situation a perceiver engages in
browsing a horizontal visual display of items (pro-
ducts), the spatial placement of the products (via
automatic, highly overlearned primacy implications
as derived from RWD) may contribute information
relevant to one’s appreciation of a particular
product, in relation to other products in the same
display.
Experiment 1a: United Kingdom,
dominant target
When faced with a horizontal pair of stimuli, partici-
pants without diagnostic cue for responding should
use spatial primacy. When quality (X) is compared
between two undistinguishable products (“which
is MOST X?”), British participants should select the
left-positioned product above-chance (H1). If
spatial primacy was not used, participants should
select randomly; that is, select the left or the right
product each, half of the time (H0).
Method
Power considerations
A pilot experiment was run, having 61 Cardiff Uni-
versity students indicate “the word implying MOST
dominance”, for pairs of horizontally presented
social role labels, such as “boss – secretary” (unam-
biguous) or “sovereign – monarch” (ambiguous).
Only for ambiguous words, an effect size of
Cohen’s d = .58 was found in favour of selecting
the left-presented word. We conducted a power
analysis based on the above effect size, a one-
sample t-test against a fixed parameter, two-tailed
testing, stipulating a power of 1 – β = .95 and an
alpha-level of .05 (GPower 3.1.3., Faul et al., 2009),
yielding a minimal required sample size of N = 41.
Taking a conservative approach on the basis of
this analysis, we planned for a minimum of N = 45
participants1.
Participants
45 students from Cardiff University participated in
this study. (40 female, mean age: 20.5 years), all
with English-spoken backgrounds, took part in the
experiment in return for course credit or monetary
payment. The experiment had received ethics
approval from Cardiff University Ethics Committee.
Materials
Twenty images of fictitious products were designed
for the purpose of this research by the first author in
collaboration with the University of South Wales’
School of Marketing and Design (at Cardiff). There
were four product categories with five individual
product images in each category. Images within a
product category were created using neutral color
palettes (avoiding salient color associations) and
having very similar hues of the same color (see an
example in Figure 1). Each product had a subtle dis-
tinguishing feature, that is, a symbol which by itself
would not be diagnostic of any particular quality.
For example, the essential oil stimuli differed in
the type of droplet, number of ripples or lines pre-
sented in their centre. All images were presented
on white square backgrounds, superimposed onto
black screens in both the learning and testing
phase (see below).
Procedure
The experiment had four blocks, corresponding to
the four product categories. Each block had a learn-
ing phase and a testing phase. In the learning phase,
participants were shown all five products in a hori-
zontal display. Each product had a fictitious chemi-
cal ingredient written underneath, for example:
“CAPRYLEHYDE”, or “OXYSOHEXYL”. This was done
to support the cover story instructions which were
to learn the associations between the different pro-
ducts and the chemical ingredients. This should also
support the impression amongst participants that
there was actually a way of rationally distinguishing
the products within a given category, even if their
1As a limitation of the present approach at calculating power, note that in the pilot study, no polarity between “the word implying MOST dom-
inance” and “the word implying LEAST dominance” is realized, as which conceptual opposition is indeed a feature of the main experiments.
Magnitude attribution is therefore only operationalized for the positive (unmarked) side of the dimension.
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learning of these associations would not be perfect.
The instructions stressed further that there were
subtle features that would allow a distinguishing
between all five products. Actually however, the
task instructed for the learning phase was not of
real interest to analysis, and generated no data.
The learning phase only served to familiarise partici-
pants with the type of stimuli to be used in the test
phase. There was also a fictitious “check-up” after
participants had ended the viewing of the product
spread via a key pressing. In the check-up, partici-
pants were presented with each of the five products
of that category, in isolation on the screen. The
product was flanked, left and right, with two of
the fictitious chemical ingredient names, one of
them being the correct one, with the position of
the correct one being randomly determined. Partici-
pants had an A4 sheet of paper in front of them and
were asked to list “left” or “right” to indicate the
correct position of the ingredient that they
thought they had seen in combination with the
product. The sequence of presenting the horizontal
spread of five products, and then the check-up, was
repeated once.
In the test phase, each of the products previously
presented in the learning phase was paired with
each of the other products to yield a series of all
possible pair combinations. For one sequence of
test presentations, in each trial, a pair was laterally
presented on a black background at a distance of
25cm between the centres of each individual
image, on the screen. Between the two images a
comparator adjective at 36 font size appeared in
white capital letters. Comparator adjectives were
for the four product categories: “WARMING”
(Scented candles), “POWERFUL” (Reed diffusers),
“REFRESHING” (Incense sticks), and “POTENT” (Essen-
tial oils). All pairs in a product category were pre-
sented in a newly generated random sequence for
each participant, and the sequence of product cat-
egories (experimental blocks) was also determined
at random for each participant. Using the specially-
marked “1” and the “9” keys on the keyboard with
the forefingers of both hands, the task for partici-
pants was to indicate the one product in the pair
that they thought was the dominant one, between
the two, on the comparator dimension. There was
no time limit for this response. To support the
response, the words “INDICATE WHICH ONE IS
MOST” were written in white capital letters at the
top of the black background on which the pairs
and the comparator word were shown (see Figure
1). After running through a first sequence of all poss-
ible pairs (10) at testing, a second sequence of all
possible pairs (10) was seamlessly run immediately
afterwards. For the first sequence, the lateral posi-
tioning of the images within a pair had been ran-
domly determined, whereas for the second
sequence, the laterality assignments within each
pair were just reversed. This way, each product was
compared to each other product twice across both
test trial sequences for a total of 20 comparisons,
and these comparisons occurred with each particu-
lar product shown on the left as well as on the
Figure 1. Example of the materials used in all experiments during the test phase: Two exemplars from the Essential oils
category in display mode for testing.
JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 5
right side within a pair, across the 20 trials. The
experiment took approximately 20 minutes, includ-
ing instructions and debriefing.
Results and discussion
The data and R scripts for analysis are available for
download at https://osf.io/ev9z4/?view_only=
feb68e8c0bdd4ead9de25c8efd22d017.
One participant was excluded from analysis on
the grounds of perfectly uniform behaviour, that
is, always “left” or always “right” in a given block.
In order to test our hypothesis of a higher selection
rate of the left-shown product than by chance alone,
left key presses were counted for each block, that is,
for each product category. Table 1 displays the
descriptive statistics obtained for the individual
experimental blocks as well as across all blocks.
Response times were on average close to 1
second and are displayed in Table 1 as well.
A one-sample t-test was conducted on the
average number of left key presses across all four
blocks against 40 (expected value under random
selection for four product type blocks with 20
trials each), in order to determine whether there
was a statistically significant tendency to select the
product displayed on the left side. “Left” responses
were more often selected than expected by
chance, M = 45.66, SD = 6.67, t(43) = 5.63, p < .001,
d = .85. Participants generally considered the
product displayed on the left side of the screen as
being greater in magnitude with respect to the
comparator than the one displayed on the right
side, supporting the alternative hypothesis.
For each block separately, the number of “left”
responses out of 20 trials was compared to the
chance value of 10, using one-sample t-tests.
Results were as follows: Left key presses for Essential
oil (comparator: “potent”): t(43) = 3.50, p < .001, d
= .53; left key presses for Incense sticks (comparator:
“refreshing”): t(43) = 3.39, p = .002, d = .51; left key
presses for Reed diffuser (comparator: “powerful”):
t(43) = 3.70, p < .001, d = .56; and left key presses
for Scented candle (comparator: “warming”): t(43)
= 5.18, p < .001, d = .78. Results indicated that the
number of left key presses was greater than the
chance level of 10 within each block.
To see whether results from the four blocks were
different, we conducted a repeated measures analy-
sis of variances with a Greenhouse-Geisser correc-
tion. There was no statistically significant difference
in number of left presses between the four blocks,
F(2.47, 106.08) = 0.72, p = .516, suggesting that the
results did not vary across product type categories.
We also calculated Bayes factors using the Bayes
Factor package in R (R Core Team, 2013). According
to Jeffreys (1961) classification scheme, the esti-
mated Bayes factors (BF10 > 100) suggested
extreme evidence for the alternative hypothesis
across all blocks (see Table 1).
Conclusively, we found that in a situation in
which discrimination between the fictitious pro-
ducts was difficult and could not be based on
obvious diagnostic cues, participants raised and
trained with left-to-right RWD had a tendency to
select the left of two items.
Experiment 1b: United Kingdom, non-
dominant target
Next, we tested for a similar influence when asking
for the non-dominant product. Left-to-right RWD-
raised participants should then be biased to the
right-positioned product in a pair. “Left” being
associated with primacy, they should preferably
select the right-positioned product (H1_1) when
asked “which of the two products is LEAST X?”. If
spatial primacy information was not used, they
should select randomly (H0).
However, “most” as comparator focuses on the
unmarked end of the magnitude dimension (e.g.
“powerful”), whereas “least” focuses on its marked
end (e.g. “powerless”, see Hamilton & Deese,
1971). Judgments at the marked end tend to be
more unreliable than at the unmarked end (Schrie-
fers, 1990; Schubert, 2005), presumably because of
the negativity entailed by the marked end, as
known to draw reasoning away from the concept
in question, reduce its accessibility, and to be
more time-consuming (Kaup & Zwaan, 2003; Mac-
Donald & Just, 1989). We (von Hecker et al., 2016)
found a left-directed bias (for Westerners) when
judging pairs using “taller” (unmarked end), but no
spatial effect using “shorter” (marked end, lack of
magnitude; see also Schubert, 2005, for similar
asymmetries). For this reason, evidence for the H0,
if obtained, will be treated as informative in terms
of the markedness distinction.
Method
Participants
46 students from Cardiff University participated in
this study. (41 female, mean age: 19.5 years), all
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with English-spoken backgrounds, took part in the
experiment in return for course credit. The exper-
iment had received ethics approval from Cardiff Uni-
versity Ethics Committee.
Materials and procedure
All materials and procedures were identical to Exper-
iment 1a except that in the test phase, participants
were asked to indicate, using the specially-marked
“1” and the “9” keys on the keyboard, the one
product in the pair that they thought was the non-
dominant one, between the two, on the comparator
dimension. To support this, the words “INDICATE
WHICH ONE IS LEAST” were written in white capital
letters at the top of the black background on which
the pairs and the comparator word were shown.
It is important to note that the present operatio-
nalisation of markedness makes the assumption
that the quantifiers “MOST” and “LEAST”, in combi-
nation with the comparator adjective, create
strong associations with the unmarked and
marked ends of the dimension in question. We
chose this kind of operationalisation over the
alternative of asking for different comparators in
the two opposing cases, for example “MOST
WARM” versus “MOST COLD”. The reason for this is
that we wanted to keep the semantics of the dimen-
sion constant, in order to be sure participants would
draw on the same dimensional representation. In
general, as one can easily see, changing the com-
parators, e.g. asking for “OLD” vs. “YOUNG”, can acti-
vate quite different associations with, e.g. old vs.
young age, such that it would become unclear,
under such circumstances, whether magnitude
judgments would indeed be based on the same
dimensional semantics.
Results and discussion
Two participants were excluded, one because it was
later revealed that this person was familiar with a
language based on right-to-left RWD. The second
participant was excluded on the basis of always
pressing the left response key (“1”) throughout the
experiment, so the following analysis are based on
N=44. Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics
obtained for the individual experimental blocks as
well as across all blocks. As obvious from Table 2
as well, response times were on average longer
than in Experiment 1a, as confirmed by a statistical
comparison of the two sets of latency data from
both experiments, t(75.12) =−9.42, p < .001. This is
consistent with the literature onmarkedness (Hamil-
ton & Deese, 1971; Schriefers, 1990). Assuming that
asking for the non-dominant element in a pair is
effectively tapping into a reasoning process at the
marked end of the dimension, with markedness
implying a negation of the affirmative concept,
and in the light of related findings that negated
terms evoke longer latencies than affirmative
terms (Kaup & Zwaan, 2003; Lea & Mulligan, 2002;
MacDonald & Just, 1989; Sanford et al., 1996) this
result is not surprising.
A one-sample t-test was conducted to find that
there was no significant difference between the
average number of left key presses across the four
blocks and the fixed parameter of 40 (expected
value under random selection for the four product
category blocks, M = 40.25, SD = 3.95, t(43) = .42, p
= .677, d = .06). Participants, on average, did not
indicate the product displayed on the right side of
the screen to be least in magnitude with respect
to the comparator as responses were at chance
level. Again, all product categories were tested sep-
arately for any bias, but none was found (for all four
t-tests, p’s were equal to, or larger than, .41). These
results led to a rejection of H1_1 as formulated for
the present experiment (see above).
A repeated measures ANOVA implied that again,
the results did not significantly differ between the
four product-categories, F(3, 129) = .19, p = .901. We
calculated the Bayes Factor (as above) to test the
Table 1. Experiment 1a, descriptive statistics of left key presses and response times obtained for comparator words in
conjunction with “most” (indication of dominant target) in addition to Bayes factors and respective classifications
according to Jeffreys (1961) in the UK (Cardiff). N = 44.
Block
Left key presses Response times (msec)
BF10 ClassificationM SD M SD
Essential Oil 11.30 2.45 1080.35 443.02 27.33 Strong evidence for H1
Incense Sticks 11.14 2.23 1147.34 476.04 20.34 Strong evidence for H1
Reed Diffuser 11.50 2.69 1143.48 493.29 46.26 Very strong evidence for H1
Scented Candle 11.73 2.21 1090.88 414.99 3324.60 Extreme evidence for H1
All blocks 11.41 1.67 1115.51 393.96 13374.64 Extreme evidence for H1
Total presses 45.66 6.67
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evidence in support of our data occurring under the
null hypothesis. Across all blocks, the estimated
Bayes factor BF10 = .18, suggested that the observed
data were almost five times more likely to have
occurred under H0 than under H1. This estimation
can be interpreted as moderate evidence in favour of
the null hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961). This interpretation
also applied for each experimental block, separately.
Table 2 displays the Bayes factors for each individual
experimental block as well as across all blocks. When
eliciting judgments on our product comparisons at
the marked end of the dimension, there seems to be
no bias that could be attributed to a spatial process.
Experiment 2: replication on a right-to-
left background
Spatial primacy information, as we suggest, is
rooted in RWD within a given cultural background.
We replicated Experiments 1a and 1b within a
single experiment, using a sample with a Farsi back-
ground (left-to-right). Predictions are symmetric.
When asking a positive comparator (X) in view of
two similar, unfamiliar products (e.g. “Which
product is MOST X?”), Participants in Iran should
preferably select the right-positioned product (H1).
When asked “Which of the two products is LEAST
X?”, Participants should preferably select the left-
positioned product (H1_1). On the other hand, if
spatial primacy information was not used, partici-
pants should select randomly (H0) throughout.
Method
The present study received ethics approval from the
Ethics committee of the Psychology Department of
Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran.
Participants
Because of their academic backgrounds and aspira-
tions, Iranian student participants at university
would have had varied, but certainly considerable,
exposure to Western international literature and
websites for which knowledge in the left–to-right
RWD would be either a precondition or would
accrue over time with practice. For this reason, the
student population cannot count as being purely
of a right-to-left RWD background. Therefore, par-
ticipant samples were drawn in rural areas, from vil-
lages around Shiraz. All selected participants were
literate, but exclusively in Farsi. They did not have
exposure to left-to-right RWD. All in all, the recruit-
ment of participants with this exclusion criterion in
place, was not easy to accomplish, so the sample
sizes are smaller in this experiment, as compared
to Experiment 1. The mean age is also higher than
in Experiment 1.
36 participants were recruited in total (25 female,
mean age: 49.7 years). Participants were allocated to
one of two experimental groups in a quasi-random
way, that is, allocating incoming participants such
that after any four participants had been allocated
to one condition, the next four were allocated to
the second condition. One condition focused the
test question on the dominant element in a pair
(“MOST” instruction, see Experiment 1), whereas
the second group focused on the non-dominant
element (“LEAST” instruction, see Experiment 1).
Materials and procedure
All materials and procedures were the same as used
in Experiment 1a (“MOST” group) and Experiment
1b (“LEAST” group), except that all instructions
and written materials had been translated into Farsi.
Results and discussion
Two participants had to be excluded because of
inconsistent allocation to experimental groups
(they had erroneously received a mixture of
“MOST” and “LEAST”), another participant (from
the “MOST” group) had to be excluded because
Table 2. Experiment 1b, descriptive statistics of left key presses and response times obtained for comparator words in
conjunction with “least” (indication of non-dominant target) in addition to Bayes factors and respective classifications
according to Jeffreys (1961) in the UK (Cardiff). N=44.
Block
Left key presses Response times (msec)
BF10 ClassificationM SD M SD
Essential Oil (comparator: “potent”) 10.16 1.28 2073.66 792.02 0.23 Moderate evidence for H0
Incense Sticks (comparator: “refreshing”) 10.11 1.74 2142.00 727.74 0.18 Moderate evidence for H0
Reed Diffuser (comparator: “powerful”) 10.05 1.79 2351.00 824.40 0.17 Moderate evidence for H0
Scented Candle (comparator: “warming”) 9.93 1.65 1915.70 769.13 0.17 Moderate evidence for H0
All blocks 10.06 .99 2120.59 588.172 0.18 Moderate evidence for H0
Total presses 40.25 3.95
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only two of the four experimental blocks were com-
pleted. This meant, effectively, for the two groups,
Nmost= 14 and Nleast= 19.
Parallel to the analyses conducted for Experiment
1, a one-sample t-test was run for both groups sep-
arately on the average number of left key presses
across all four blocks against 40, in order to deter-
mine whether there was a statistically significant
tendency to select the product displayed on either
side. For the “MOST” group, “left”-responses were
less often selected than expected by chance, M =
32.21, SD = 7.47, t(13) =−3.90, p = .002, d = 1.04. Par-
ticipants generally considered the product dis-
played on the right side of the screen as of greater
magnitude with respect to the comparator than
the one displayed on the left side, supporting the
alternative hypothesis. For each block separately,
the number of “left” responses out of 20 trials was
compared to the chance value of 10, using one-
sample t-tests. Results were as follows: Left key
presses for Essential oil (comparator: “potent”): t
(13) =−3.19, p = .007, d = .85; left key presses for
Incense sticks (comparator: “refreshing”): t(13) =
−3.22, p = .007, d = .86; left key presses for Reed
diffuser (comparator: “powerful”): t(13) =−3.98, p
= .002, d = 1.06; and left key presses for Scented
candle (comparator: “warming”): t(13) =−2.86, p
< .01, d = .76. Results indicated that the number of
left key presses was smaller than the chance level
of 10 within each block. A repeated measures
ANOVA within the “MOST” group determined that
there was no statistically significant difference in
number of left presses between the four blocks, F
(3, 39) = 1.14, p = .35, suggesting that the results
did not vary across product type categories. The
Bayes factors across all experimental blocks in this
group was BF10 = 23.35, suggesting strong evidence
for H1, see Table 3.
The correspondent overall one-sample t-test in
the “LEAST” group revealed a non-significant differ-
ence between the average number of left key
presses across the four blocks and the fixed par-
ameter of 40 (M = 40.84, SD = 7.14), t(18) = .51, p
= .614, d = .12. In contrast to the “MOST”-condition,
results thus indicated that participants selected
the product to be least in feature magnitude more
or less randomly, rejecting the alternative hypoth-
esis H1_1. In the “LEAST” group, there was no signifi-
cant deviation from random key selection in any
particular product category separately (all p’s
larger than .54 except for Essential oils, p = .13).
Neither were there any significant differences
between product categories, in terms of a Green-
house-Geisser-corrected ANOVA on the number of
left key presses, F(2.07, 37.25) = .85, p = .44. The
Bayes factors across all experimental blocks in this
group was BF10 = .27, suggesting moderate evi-
dence for H0, see Table 3.
Descriptive statistics obtained for the individual
experimental blocks as well as across all blocks, sep-
arated by condition, are displayed in Table 3. As can
be seen from Table 2, response times appeared to
be slightly longer in the “LEAST” group than in the
“MOST” group, as expected from Experiment 1
and the markedness argument, but this tendency
was not statistically significant, t(31) =−.59, p = .56.
Analysing the key presses between the two
groups, we compared overall “left”-responses
made and found a significant difference, Mmost=
32.21, Mleast= 40.84, t(31) =−3.36, p = .002. When
asked to indicate the dominant element in a pair,
participants chose the left one less often than
when indicating the non-dominant element.
Conclusively, we found that participants raised
and trained exclusively with right-to-left RWD had
a tendency to select the right of two items when
making judgments in a situation in which discrimi-
nation between fictitious products was difficult
and could not be based on obvious diagnostic cues.
General discussion
UK participants exhibited a medium-sized effect of
preferably selecting the left of two similar products,
whereas participants in Iran tended to prefer the
right one, when asked to indicate the dominant
one (“MOST X”). Indicating the non-dominant one
(“LEAST X”), participants in both countries showed
no bias (see Figure 2). This pattern indicates an attri-
bution of spatial primacy to the magnitude as seen
in a given object quality. Earlier studies suggest that
such attributions might indeed happen. Englund
and Hellström (2013), using a word-valence-rating
task, found a left-preference bias (or, first-read-
bias) in the positive case, reverting to right-prefer-
ence in the negative case. The difference to our
paradigm is that subject-object sentences were
used as stimuli. The authors argue that whatever
stimulus happens to be the sentence subject
receives most weight in the decision, as compared
to the sentence object. Thus, their effect may be
syntactic/linguistic rather than spatial.
For drawings with a left- or rightward directional-
ity (e.g. body orientation), participants have been
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found to prefer RWD-congruent directionalities
(Chokron & De Agostini, 2000; Ishii et al., 2011;
Loffing et al., 2017). Participants probably transfer
RWD-based spatial primacy information into judg-
ments about a quality of the object. Notably, the
stimuli carried left- or rightward directionality
within themselves, whereas the present project is
interested in pairs of objects with no inbuilt
directionality.
We submit that spatial primacy, in terms of object
location within a display, can convey information
relevant to the attribution of magnitudes in
feature objects. Spatial primacy blends with dimen-
sional dominance (Casasanto, 2009; von Hecker
et al., 2016, 2019, 2020), such that an object that
has “more” of a quality can be mentally represented
as positioned closer to the RWD origin. Blending in
mental space means that RWD determines a direc-
tional representation (akin to an action hierarchy),
according to which whatever “comes first” will be
attributed “more” of the quality. The reversal of pat-
terns between the UK and Iran suggests spatial
grounding by virtue of the learned RWD. As RWD
can underly reasoning and decision-making with
ordered mental representations, our argument is
close to the spatial grounding assumption for the
number line (e.g. Dehaene et al., 1993; Gevers
et al., 2006; Ito & Hatta, 2004)2.
Table 3. Experiment 2, descriptive statistics of left key presses and response times obtained for comparator words in






BF10 ClassificationM SD M SD
Most Essential Oil (comparator: “potent”) 7.93 2.43 1468.06 769.34 7.48 Moderate evidence for H1
Incense Sticks (comparator: “refreshing”) 7.57 2.82 1788.33 1085.50 7.91 Moderate evidence for H1
Reed Diffuser (comparator: “powerful”) 8.14 1.75 2696.89 2832.01 26.48 Strong evidence for H1
Scented Candle (comparator: “warming”) 8.57 1.87 2377.42 1776.73 4.47 Moderate evidence for H1
All blocks 8.05 1.87 2082.68 903.53 23.35 Strong evidence for H1
Total presses 32.21 7.47
Least Essential Oil (comparator: “potent”) 10.79 2.18 1491.17 1171.26 0.68 Anecdotal evidence for H0
Incense Sticks (comparator: “refreshing”) 10.42 2.91 4057.75 6623.48 0.28 Moderate evidence for H0
Reed Diffuser (comparator: “powerful”) 9.89 3.25 1726.85 971.36 0.24 Moderate evidence for H0
Scented Candle (comparator: “warming”) 9.74 2.16 2346.89 2405.85 0.27 Moderate evidence for H0
All blocks 10.21 1.79 2405.66 1905.58 0.27 Moderate evidence for H0
Total presses 40.84 7.14
Figure 2. Violin plot of the data distributions for both conditions (“MOST” and “LEAST”) in the two countries (UK: Left-to-
right RWD, and Iran: Right-to-left RWD). The Y-axis refers to the number of left-choices across all four blocks. The expected
value for this is 40 under random selection.
2The interpretation of results relating to the number line, on the surface, may look contradictory to our assumptions, as for example in the West,
small numerical magnitudes are thought to be associated with left space and larger numerical magnitudes with right space. Therefore, one might
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Regarding the bimodality of the distributions of
left key responses (see Figure 2), some participants
might have deliberately “recognised” there being
no diagnostic information, thus responding at
random. Other participants might have used
spatial information (resulting in spatial bias).
Looking into individual differences with regards to
strategies used is beyond the scope of the present
paper, but is of further interest.
Casasanto’s (2009) research poses an alternative
prediction, as by his approach, horizontal space
can also serve as metaphorical projection of a
valence dimension, such that, on the grounds of
handedness, right is associated with good, and left
with bad. Following this logic, and as most of our
product features were positive in valence, we
should expect results contrary to the ours, in the
MOST condition: In Cardiff, products displayed on
the right should be perceived as possessing more
of the good quality than those on the left,
whereas the Shiraz results would fit the valence-
based prediction. In terms of the LEAST condition
however, neither sample’s data support an expla-
nation via a horizontal valence dimension: In this
case one predicts a uniform left-bias for the pro-
ducts in Cardiff as well as in Shiraz, which is not
what we found.
Is it “mere primacy” (without blending)?
We propose that primacy is blendedwith dominance
in terms of a dimensional magnitude. Alternatively,
the preference observed here could be merely due
to an automatic link between sequential primacy
and an elevated salience of the stimulus perceived
first. However, findings on laterality and preference
often pertain to specific consumer-relevant situ-
ations with co-determining factors (Biswas et al.,
2014; Chae & Hoegg, 2013; Deng & Kahn, 2009;
Romero & Biswas, 2016; Valenzuela & Raghubir,
2009). The simple design used here addresses the
role of RWD-induced spatial primacy more
rigorously.
Second, if primacy was the exclusive factor,
“LEAST” and “MOST” should yield identical patterns:
Participants would preferably choose the element
closest to RWD origin. This was not the case, as an
asymmetric pattern resulted. We therefore submit
metaphoric blending as crucial factor: Primacy may
be blended with mental simulation of a positive
magnitude of an attribute, but may not well be
blended with mental simulation of a lack thereof
(Casasanto, 2009; von Hecker et al., 2016, 2019;
von Hecker & Klauer, 2020), explaining the asymme-
trical finding between the “MOST” and “LEAST” con-
ditions as observed in UK and Iran.
Third, if primacy was mapped onto grammatical
comparison, “MOST” as much as “LEAST” should
be placed close to the origin of the spatial dimen-
sion, as both expressions are grammatical superla-
tives. However, in contrast, primacy appears to be
related to the meaning of the magnitude in ques-
tion. The finding that spatial biases occur in the
“MOST” condition but not in the “LEAST” condition
suggests that an element identified as “MOST” dom-
inates the other one in mental simulation just
because that element’s spatial primacy is blended
with magnitude.
Asymmetric results in the light of linguistic
markedness
Response generation under “MOST X” versus “LEAST
X” instructions yielded symmetrical effect vs. no-
effect patterns in both countries. Based on the lit-
erature on linguistic markedness (Hamilton &
Deese, 1971) one may attempt to interpret the
results in two possible ways. First, as just a re-state-
ment of the often-reported greater unreliability of
making a judgment at the marked than at the
unmarked dimensional end (Schriefers, 1990; Schu-
bert, 2005; van der Schoot et al., 2009), one may
predict not only longer response latencies in the
marked than in the unmarked case, but also a
greater proportion of (error) variance associated
with the slowing. On the other hand, to the extent
that responses at the marked end imply some sort
of negation of the dimensional semantics (“reversal”
of the meaning), one might stipulate a more reliable
difference in the process that leads to response gen-
eration, that is, on the basis of the literature on
negation and attentional focus (Kaup & Zwaan,
predict for the present paradigm that the right side (not the left one) should be judged as having most of a property. However, in our view, the
semantics of the number line are best described by “counting.” As for example in Western backgrounds the reading/writing schema implies, an
action starting from the left and proceeding towards the right, this action means counting upwards in discrete units, starting with “1”. This
number represents the beginning and therefore highest dominance, as the counting starts with it. We argue further that the second action
in the counting sequence, “2”, is dominated by “1” and itself dominates “3”, as one goes along the counting dimension. This means that although
the denoted magnitudes of the counted numbers increase from left to right, their primacies continually decrease, as each step that comes before
another one always has higher primacy in the action sequence.
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2003; Lea & Mulligan, 2001; MacDonald & Just, 1989;
Sanford et al., 1996). In this case, responses at the
marked end should not contain more error than
those at the unmarked end. Inspecting the data in
Tables 1–3 gives eyeball support for the latter expla-
nation in the UK (proportion of SD versusM = .35 for
“MOST”, and .27 for “LEAST”), and for the former
explanation in Iran (proportion of SD versus M
= .43 for “MOST”, and .79 for “LEAST”). In our
earlier research we directly compared processing
at the unmarked and the marked end of a number
of different order dimensions (von Hecker et al.,
2016) and found clear spatial primacy effects for
“unmarked”, but no effects for “marked”. Likewise
Schubert (2005) in his work on power and verticality
found still significant, but much smaller effects
when participants were asked to indicate the “less
powerful” concept (marked end) in a vertical
display of two concepts, compared with the instruc-
tion to indicate the “more powerful” concept
(unmarked end). The similarity in the asymmetric
pattern observed in the present data between UK
and Iran leads us to believe that there are systematic
differences in the way our participants processed
their judgments at the unmarked and the marked
end of the quality dimensions. However, the
current data do not yet allow for the conclusion
that it is indeed markedness that distinguishes the
“most” and the “least” condition. To this end, it
would be informative to vary markedness and dom-
inance orthogonally (preferably with adjectives
without morphological marking, e.g. most warm
vs. least warm vs. most cold vs. least cold)3. These




The concept of polarity correspondence (Lakens,
2012; Proctor & Cho, 2006) makes use of marked-
ness as auxiliary construct, since the idea is here
that the unmarked end of a dimension be “plus-
coded” whereas the marked end be “minus-
coded”. Another assumption is that responses also
are “plus”-and “minus” coded, namely, a response
on the right side “plus” and a response on the left
side “minus”. Within this approach, spatial
mapping effects occur as a result of congruence,
or incongruence, between stimulus-code and
response-code. It is difficult to explain our present
results with these assumptions. We would have to
assume that the unmarked pole for the stimulus
dimension (via primacy through RWD) is left in the
Cardiff sample, and right in the Shiraz sample. That
being the case, and as the response dimension is
“plus”-poled on the right side, at least for right-
handers (Proctor & Cho, 2006), one would have to
predict a facilitation effect for the right side
through correspondence between stimulus- and
response-code in Shiraz, but no facilitation in
Cardiff, as these codes would not correspond. The
present results are therefore easier explained by
assuming that RWD-based primacy is influencing
responses without any particular codes on the
response-side.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we submit that the spatial positioning
of an object or entity within a horizontal display
may contribute information relevant to one’s
appreciation of that entity relative to others within
the same display. This presumably occurs via auto-
matic, highly overlearned primacy implications as
derived from RWD. Whilst this research still has to
be extended to see whether similar effects are in
fact obtainable in the social domain (e.g. with pic-
tures of faces, or more dynamic materials involving
target persons), the present findings imply the
possibility that spatial primacy may trigger percep-
tions of product qualities and quantities in relation
to stimulus features in general that are otherwise
not obvious, that is, are not part of the explicit
stimulus presentation. According to the present
findings, the exact way how spatial factors exert
this kind of influence should be examined with
reference to the particular cultural background in
which, for example, a product advertisement cam-
paign is being launched (see Ploom et al., 2020). It
is important to stress again that, similar to the argu-
ment made by Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001)
about mental fluency, we do not believe that
spatial primacy would usually act in the foreground.
In most everyday situations relating to ranking,
ordering, or making decisions about priority and
preference, there exist stable, pre-existing cues
and features that will trigger these decisions. But
as demonstrated in the present research, lack of
sufficient information and a simultaneous
3We thank one of the Reviewers for making us aware of this issue and for suggesting the possible approach to its solution.
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commitment to making a response may create a
situation in which spatial primacy will have its effect.
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